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ABSTRACT

Designing and maintaining the security of system
information is the primary duty of the cyber security
professional. In today's world, nearly all government

agencies manage some form of financial, defense, national
security, and/or privacy information security policies. It

is also necessary in this environment that government
agencies are accountable for auditing the security systems
that protect this information. However,

the great number

of security auditing tools and methodologies available

still do not solve one key issue: How can auditors create
a standard for verifying their security policies are being
enforced correctly using these methodologies and tools? It

is the premise of this paper that formalized policy

specifications and focused penetration testing are needed
to effectively audit any information system. This paper
offers a framework for creating the semi-formal to formal

policy specifications needed to produce a focused auditing
tool capable of verifying such policies are being enforced

in a Multi-Level Security environment.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Policy Based Management
Designing and maintaining the security of system
information is the primary duty of the cyber security

professional. In today's world, nearly all government
agencies manage some form of financial, defense, national

security, and/or privacy information security policies.

Whether they are NIST1, FISMA2, or FIPS3 policies,

the

accountability and enforcement of these policies remain in

the domain of security management and these policies

outline the computer security management requirements of
agencies operating within this environment. Such
policy-based management is considered key in managing

large-scale distributed systems such as government
agencies operating in a Multi-Level Security (MLS)

environment using the Bell-LaPadula model of security
classification and categories.

However, due to the complexity of this type of

management there is an issue in establishing a benchmark
for policy enforcement. While auditing is generally
thought of as the standard method for assessing and

verifying security policy,

the fundamental problem

1

remains: How to create a standard auditing methodology to

achieve policy verification? For most government agencies,
auditing is an incomprehensible web of law, best
practices,

training, and policy standards that make up the

requirements of auditing, whether it is financial,

operational,

or technology based. In addition,

government

organizations now have the added responsibility of
implementing security audits that are used to assess the
security and the verification of policy within the network

information system.

After completing the audit of the security system,
additional testing is normally done to verify if the
security policies are, in fact, in place and enforced.

Black Box Penetration testing4 is used to "blindly" look

for vulnerabilities that can be exploited, allowing

unauthorized access to the system. Verifying the security
of systems using black box "blind" testing does establish

whether a hacker, without previous knowledge of the
system,

can find a vulnerability. However,

it is still

unclear whether relevant security policies are being
enforced when it is the normal practice in Black Box

testing to only look for a single way in. This is
particularly important when the skill level of penetration
testers may vary significantly. Without building a

2

benchmark or framework for the correct enforcement of

security policies, a security standard cannot be
maintained.

However complex) this type of distributed
policy-based management does have one advantage. Its very
structure allows for a more standardized approach to
configuring the systems according to security policy and

allows for the universal implementation of security

system-wide. This is particularly important when dealing
with large, multi-segmented, distributed systems,

covering

different geographic areas. By creating semi-formal
specifications, security policies can be visualized in
diagrams demonstrating how users, objects, permissions,

and the various trust boundaries interact from the
security policies being employed. By formalizing these

policies through the use of specification languages such

as XACML, they can be translated into formalized,

or

programmed, machine-readable "specifications" that can be
used to automate the configuration process. In this

manner,

the security policies are put into "formalized"

scripts that are then directly configured to devices on
the network. This eliminates much of the human error
resulting from manual configuration, as well as

3

maintaining configuration consistencies while reducing the
cost of implementing security policies system-wide.

The main goal of this paper is to create a practical

framework for translating these policies into a
"semi-formalized" form. These semi-formal specifications,

or diagrams, defining MLS access control information flows

will allow the reader to translate them in more formal
specifications using the programming language of their

choice, whether that is extensible Access Control Markup

Language5 (Moses, 2005), Ponder6 (Damianou,

2001),

or

something else. The motivation behind this framework is to

assist agencies in standardizing their approach to
implementing policies and thereby increase the level of
security,

network,

enforce policies correctly throughout the
and automate policy configuration. This is

especially useful when creating and implementing policy on

new systems early in the system design phase of the System
Development Life Cycle7 (SDLC). By implementing this
framework on new systems,

the need for the verification of

policy is mitigated. In addition, when applying this
framework to existing systems, it adds an extra step in

the verification of existing policy specifications through

the use of an auditing tool,

the penetration-testing

database. By formalizing specifications,

4

through the use

of high-level programming languages, agencies will not
only be able to automate their configuration process but

also verify their system's policies using this more
focused auditing and penetration testing method. Without
creating a semi-formal or, more specifically, a more
formalized policy specification, auditing and testing

cannot be accurately performed on a system. It is through

the process of auditing and testing a system that make it

possible to determine whether the security policies in

place are actually being enforced correctly.
Specifically,

this paper proposes a practical

framework for combining the LDAP information directory

tree (DIT) and MLS information flow policy to create

semi-formalized MLS policy specifications. To gain the
granularity necessary, this paper also proposes using the

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol model

(LDAP). The

LDAP, through its own physical model, mimics the

organizational structure of the agency. Combining the LDAP

DIT with the MLS information flow policy permits the
"allowed" information flows between agency organizational
units to be defined. By mapping the information flows to

the organization, security personnel can see distinctly

the trust boundaries where access control becomes
paramount.

5

To account for the additional security requirements

within the MLS environment, we also propose adding
additional attributes to the LDAP model. By creating

additional LDAP attributes to filter these latent security
requirements,

shown by overlapping the LDAP DIT with the

MLS information flow policy, we create an MLS "aware"
LDAP. Through this approach it is possible to design

greater granularity in security policy enforcement, such

as security sensitivity and classification, category and

IP address range. By carrying these additional security
attributes,

the information flows show the direction and

level of the flow of information as it pertains to each
user request.

6

Aware Lightweight Directory Access Protocol and Designing

the Focused Testing Tool

The semi-formalized, or formalized,

specification represents a security topology of the

users' permissions similar to a map and also shows
the location of trust boundaries8 within the system.

By analyzing semi-formal specifications,

agencies can

identify how policies translate to devices on the
network and determine where the vulnerabilities
resulting from such policies may impact the system as

a whole.

7

By basing our method on this type of
semi-formalized policy specifications,

agencies can

implement policies governing the authorized
activities of legitimate users and more accurately

mediate user access to resources on the system. It is
also possible to specify the permissible location of

the user and assets, verify whether authentication
and authorization have been implemented correctly,

and determine through audit and testing whether
information flows contradict security requirements in

any way.
In addition, organizing more focused penetration

testing could be accomplished by designing a database
to reflect our practical framework and information
flow policy diagram to generate queries regarding

potential vulnerabilities. Applying the LDAP's
customized MLS attributes to query the target and

user's permissions,

the auditor could be given the

corresponding vulnerabilities to be tested
determining whether the required mitigation was

actually in place. It is through using this tool that
auditors would know, whether policies were being

enforced across the board, rather than using black

8

box testing to look blindly for a single hole in the

system.

9

CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

In order to fully understand the requirements of the
MLS environment and the corresponding need for this
framework,

it is necessary to completely understand the

origins and basis of the security environment, Multi-Level

Security9

(MLS), and the access control therein. This

chapter details general background information about the

Multi-Level Security (MLS), Bell-LaPadula (BLP) access
model, and Lightweight Access Directory Protocol

(LDAP).

Related work focusing on verification of policy,

access

control mechanisms,

specification languages and the

results of the work already done in these areas are also

discussed below.

2.1 Multi-Level Security (MLS)
"Many organizations, such as the military services,

intelligence organizations, related government agencies,

and their supporting defense industries require
Multi-Level Security (MLS) model systems. These systems
enable concurrent processing of data that is classified

with respect to different levels of security. MLS has a
capability that allows information with different

sensitivity levels to be'simultaneously stored and

10

processed in a system accessed by users that have

different levels of security clearance, as seen in NISTIR
731610"

(Son, 2008). In this paper the sensitivity or

security levels are unclassified, classified, secret, and

top secret.
"The rationale behind the MLS model is to secure
information at a higher security level from access by

users at a lower level of security clearance. One
mechanism for implementing this policy is to assign

security labels to all assets in a system"

(Son, 2008).

The labels represent the level of sensitivity of the
information or the level of sensitivity to which a subject

is allowed access. This mechanism prevents subjects from
accessing information with a security label for which they

are not cleared. To decide whether a specific access mode
is allowed,

the clearance of a subject is compared to the

classification of an object. This is the approach taken in

the well-known Bell-LaPadula (BLP)11 access model

(Bell,

2005). The BLP model is explained in the next section.

2.2 Multi-Level Security (MLS) Policy Model

The main goal of MLS policies is to regulate how
information may flow between designated sensitivities. MLS

polices are designed to control the confidentiality of

11

information flows and prevent the information leakage from

an entity of a higher sensitivity level

entity of a lower sensitivity level

(High)

to an

(Low). Protecting

against such a leakage of information from High to Low is

very important to nearly any organization whether

governmental, military or private commercial enterprise.
Information flow policy12 in MLS systems can be

defined by a lattice model13, which was introduced to

describe policies and channels of information flow: an
information flow policy is defined by a lattice (SC, ^),

where SC is a finite set of security classes

entities), and

is a binary relation partially ordering

the classes of SC. For example,

and Low,

(or

for security classes High

the relation Low i High means class Low

information is lower or equal to class High information

(it is said that class High dominates class Low).
Information is permitted to flow within a class or upward,

but not downward or to unrelated classes. Thus, class Low
information is permitted to flow into class High if and
only if Low i High. The most famous and influential

security policy model which deals with information flow in

the MLS system was first introduced by David Bell and

Elliot LaPadula in 1973 for the Department of Defense
(Son, 2008) .

12

Bell-LaPadula (BLP) access model was proposed to
enforce access control in government and military
applications and supports Mandatory Access Control14 (MAC)

by determining the access right from the sensitivity
levels associated with subjects and objects. These

subjects are given a sensitivity level or security

clearance, and objects are also given a similar security
classification. To properly enforce access control in a
MLS environment,

the Bell-LaPadula access model defines

two security properties:
•

Simple Security (SS) property: subject S can
read to object o only if the security level L
of s dominates the security level

of o, i.e.,

Io i ls. This property is also known as

"no-read-up"
•

(Son, 2008).

*-property: subject s can write to object o only
if the security level
security level of

of o dominates the

of s,

i.e.,

i lo . This

property is also known as "no-write-down"

(Son,

2008).

To allow for greater granularity of information
control,

the BLP model was expanded by adding categories

that group information into a need-to-know-basis. These

13

categories serve to restrict access to certain types of

information, while keeping users within the confines of
their security clearance. A subject must have a superset

of the object's categories to dominate the object. The
categories and security sensitivity or clearance allow for

a more granular restriction of information assets as well
as tighter information control throughout the system as a

whole.
Figure 2 illustrates an MLS information flow policy
enforced by BLP model. The arrows in the figure show the

direction of permissible information flow. For example, as
shown in the figure,

information can flow from entity A

with a sensitivity of unclassified and {Cl} as the
category to entity B with a sensitivity of classified and
{cl, c3} as the categories; This is because the
sensitivity of classified dominates the sensitivity of

unclassified '(classified < unclassified), and {cl, C3} is
a superset of {cl}

(i.e.,

{cl}

c {cl, c3}). However,

the

security policy is violated if information flows from an
entity with sensitivity classified and {cl, c3} as the

categories to an entity with a sensitivity of secret and
{cl, c2} as the categories. This is because classified <
secret, and {cl, c2} is not a superset of {cl, c3}

(i.e.,

{cl, c3} <z {cl, c2}) - this is why there is no arrow

14

drawn from classified with {cl, c3] to secret with {cl,
c2} .

Generic Information Flow Policy

2.3 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

(LDAP)

As a protocol for accessing directory services,
development of the LDAP began in the 1980s by the

International Telecommunications Union and
Telecommunications standardization sector (ITU-T) and the

15

International Standards Organization (ISO)

for Unix and

Linux to improve network communications. LDAP was

initiated in conjunction with the development of
Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol

(TCP/IP) and is the standard for internet communication

today. The LDAP model is outlined in Request for
Information (Wahl, 1997). The LDAP was intended to provide

access to directories supporting the x.500 model.15 The
LDAP is referred to as "lightweight" because it does not

require the same intensive amount of resources as x.500
and it is not as complex to implement. As a directory

service, X.500 was a weighty and complex platform that
required the use of the OSI stack and was not compatible

with TCP/IP. The x.500 protocol lacked the flexibility of
the LDAP model and could not be used with TCP/IP, which
was quickly becoming the standard for internet packet
transmission.

In addition, unlike the x.500 model, the

LDAP protocol was designed specifically for management

applications and browser applications that offer
read/write interactive access to directories

(Wahl,

1997).

LDAP directories use a hierarchical model to store
data about the system. The LDAP protocol assumes that

there are one or more servers, with each providing access
to the Directory Information Tree (DIT). The DIT is a

16

collection of entries, where each has several attributes

that declare a Distinguished Name (DN),

that is made up of

one or more of these attribute values. The Distinguished
name (DN) must be unique within the DIT and can be created
from a concatenation of several attributes. For example:

DN: CN = Betty Brown, 0 = Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, C = US.16

Figure 3. A Generic Directory Information Tree

Each entry must also have an objectclass. The
"objectclass" refers to the class that is assigned to the

17

entry. Objectclasses define what attributes are required,

optionally required and their attribute type. It also
refers to how many values can be stored, as well as the

kind of attribute stored. Attribute type refers to what

kind of information is being stored, outlines the syntax
that is to be used when creating the attribute,

the kinds

of matching that can be applied to the values of each

attribute, and any other functions allowed.
As added flexibility in the LDAP model, clients can
modify the values for each objectclass; however, servers
can restrict these modifications to prevent the basic

structure of the class from becoming too altered. Servers
must also prevent clients from adding additional classes
not already introduced in the schemas. There are many

different types of attributes ranging from operational-

which cannot be modified because they are used for
administering the directory itself- to optional and naming

attributes, which can be altered to suit the needs of the
client.

In addition to the (DN),

the LDAP also calls for

attributes such as organizational unit (OU), which refers
to the name of the container the entry belongs to,
department,

e.g.,

type, or location of an entry. The

organizational unit allows the LDAP to break down the

18

organizational structure into smaller and smaller units,

or containers, within the directory. These mandatory

attributes may also be single or multi-valued as well
(Arkills 2003). In addition, there are naming attributes

that make up the LDAP directory, like Common Name (CN),
and Domain Component (DC) which give the entry's name and
the type of network it is on,

such as .org,

.com, or .edu.

Naming attributes are used for access control,

such as

User ID (UID), Group ID (GID), User ID Number (uidNumber),

and Group ID Number (gidNumber), all of which control user

access authentication on the system (Wahl, 1997).

objectclass: Person
dn: dc= energy, dc=org
ou: RND
cn: John Smith
sn: Smith
uid: smithj@rnd23543
uidNumber: 1200
gidNumber: 510
homeDirectory: /home/rnd/research/smithj

phone number: 212-254-0876
address: 1234 Main Street,
Washington, DC 12034
Figure 4. Generic Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
Entry
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To maintain control over the various attribute types,

the LDAP model uses the schema as a way to sort and order
the attribute type definitions, object class definitions,

and other information. The server uses this information to

find how to match a filter, or attribute value insertion,

when comparing an operation request from a client against
the attributes of an entry (Wahl,

1997). There are several

default schemas used when creating an LDAP server,

as well

as option of creating a customized LDAP schema. These
default schemas are available for download on the various

LDAP websites for all the different LDAP software

platforms. OpenLDAP,

for instance, offers several default

distributed schemas on their website: core.schema,

cosine.schema, inetorgperson.schema, misc.schema,
nis.schema, and openldap.schema (OpenLDAP Software 2.4

Administrator's Guide, 2013).

To create a customized schema for an LDAP directory,

a local.schema must be employed. The local.schema allows
customized attributes to be created and defined for
implementation into the directory. The schemas are located

in Linux as:

/etc/openLDAP/slapd.conf. The local.schema

would be added to this file with the rest of the
distributed schemas in order to include the customized

object class and attribute definitions. It is through the

20

DIT organizational structure and use of the additional

attributes in the custom schema that allows more
transparency in the security filtering process and allows
auditors to see how security policies impact the system.

The following is some of the content of a slapd.conf file
showing how to implement a local.schema using CentOS 5.8

(Linux).

#See slapd.conf [5] for details on configuration options.
#This file should not be world readable.
#
include
/etc/openldap/schema/core.schema
include
/etc/openldap / schema/cosine.schema
include
/etc/openldap/schema/inetorgperson.schema
include
/etc/openldap/schema/nis.schema
include
/etc/openldap/schema/local.schema

Figure 5. Slapd.conf File Schema List

The local.schema, or custom schema, would include the

object classes, matching rules, and data type rules for
value insertion, as well as definitions for the attributes

themselves

(See Appendix A for an example of implementing

a custom schema based on this framework). Based on the
above DIT,

the attribute definitions would include the

following information: the heritance (if any),

equality (comparison rules), Substring rules

21

the

(if any), and

the syntax rules

(OpenLDAP Software 2.4 Administrator's

Guide, 2013).

To begin creating a new schema for an LDAP design,

the local.schema will need to be renamed to reflect the

custom object class and attributes being added to the
directory. For example, if making a custom schema for

mapping an IP range and location to a local person type,

make a local.schema and use the following path:

/etc/openLDAP/schema/local.schema.
The attributes are included in the schema first

because they must be read first by the LDAP before being
included in the object class definitions. As is shown in
the following example:

22

#New attribute definitions:
attributeType (1.1.2.2.1 NAME 'ipRange'
DESC TP Range’
EQUALIITY caseExactMatch
SUBSTR caseExactSubstringsMatch
SYNTAX 1.1.2.2.1.1466.115.121.1.15(1024))

attributetype (1.1.2.2.2 NAME 'location'
DESC ‘location’
EQUALIITY caseExactMatch
SUBSTR caseExactSubstringsMatch
SYNTAX 1.1.2.2.1.1466.115.121.1.15(1024))
## objectclass definitions for ‘misPerson' depends on the core.schema.

objectClass (I.I.2.2. Name 'IocalPerson’
DESC “local person type’
SUP top Structural
MUST (ipRange $ location )
MAY ( userPassword )
)
Figure 6. Generic Custom Schema

Following the creation of the custom schema,

the LDIF

file would need to be configured to accept the new data
attributes,

create the directory structure,

and would

allow new entries to be created. The slapd.conf file is

important because it outlines the structure of the LDAP
directory service on the server. It also specifies all the
objectclass and attribute's rules

(schemas), global and

otherwise, which govern the LDAP directory. The order of
the schema files listed in the slapd.conf file is also

important (OpenLDAP Software 2.4 Administrator's Guide,
2013). Like the custom schema,

23

the attributes need to be

read before they can be included in the new objectclass

definition.17
Once the schemas are complete,

amended to reflect the new schemas

the slapd.conf file is

(see Figure 6}. The

LDIF file is built to outline the directory's structure,
and the LDAP can be used and new entries added. By
including LDAP model to the design of the MLS access

control, there is flexibility to use it as an auditing

tool. Because of the methodology in designing the DIT,
mapping the Information Flow policy to its structure is a
natural process and creates a visual representation of the

access control mechanism itself. Designing an auditing
tool necessary to utilize this information is the next
logical step following creating the methodology for

generating the semi-formal specifications of the MLS
information flow policy.

24

dn: dc=energy, dc=.org, o=ferc
Description: Custom objectClass for MLS sensitivity and category objects in
LDAP
cn:energy
objectclass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: misPerson
name: Betty Brown
sn: Brown
ou: R&D Dept
location: Washington, DC
ip range: 192.168.1.10/254
phone: 212-234-0987
email: brownb@energy.org

Figure 7. Generic LDAP Data Interchange Format File

2.4 Related Work
Access control is one of the most important and

widely used authorization policies available. It controls

which subjects such as users or processes have access to
which resources, or objects, in a system. Over the past
several decades, many access control policies, or models,

have been proposed. Some of models introducing the early
concepts of access control mechanisms were Discretionary

Access Control

(Lampson, 1971), Mandatory Access Control

(Bell & LaPadula,

(TBAC)

1976), Task Based Authorization Controls

(Thomas, 1997), Role Based Access Control

(RBAC)

(Ferraiolo, Sandhu, & Gavrila, 2001), and Organization
Role Based Access Control

(ORBAC)

25

(Kalam et al., 2003) .

While these studies lay the foundation for access control
as we know it today, none of these models were able to

prescribe the methodology for verifying security policies.

However, the study by Kalam et al

(2003), does add some

insight in its focus on the concept of organization;

it

proposes the Organizational Role Based Access Control

policy model (ORBAC). Using the concept of organization, a

security policy can be applied to a target organization
and is defined as a collection of permissions,
prohibitions, obligations, and recommendations. Even so,
it does not offer the added granularity of the MLS

configuration or the flexibility and organization of the
LDAP directory configuration. The ORBAC model does not
offer the same stringent access control that is offered in
the combination of the MLS aware LDAP model and can be

complex in its administration. The use of an LDAP is

proposed to simplify the task of managing security in a
large distributed system (DMTF: DEN Initiative, n.d.,

Jamhour, 2001) .
As today's information systems are rapidly growing in

scale and complexity due to an emergence of new
technologies and security requirements, policy-driven
management is gaining popularity. Policy driven management
systems have been researched to specify their targets,
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constraints, and access control mechanisms in the form of

policies. Policy languages are used to write
specifications for the policy-driven management systems
and categorized into network management policy languages
and security management policy languages

(Han & Lei,

2011). Network management policy languages aim to allocate
resources within a network according to the system
requirements

control,

(e. g. bandwidth, device configuration, access

etc.) whereas Security management policy

languages focus on the protection of system resources and

the administrator's method of security management. For the

purpose of reference, lists of the most widely used in
this paper are as follows.
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Table 1. Network Specification Languages

Network Policy Language

Reference Paper

Knowledge Acquisition in
automated Specification
(KAOS)

Dardennen, A. V. (1993). Goal Directed
Requirements Acquisition. Science of
Computer Programming 20, 3-50.

Policy Description Language
(PDL)

Lobo, J. B. (1999). A Policy Description
Language. 16th National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (pp. 291-298).
Orlando, FL: Association for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.

Ponder

Damianou, N. D. (2001). The Ponder
Policy Specification Language. Policy
2001: Workshop on Policies for
Distributed Systems and Networks
(pp. 18-39). Bristol, UK: Springer.

CIM Simplified Policy
Language

DMTF Policy Working Group: Lobo, J. B.
(2009). CIM Simplified Policy Language
DSP0231. Portland, OR: Distributed
Management Task Force, Inc.
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Table 2. Security Specification Languages

Reference Paper

Security Policy Language
A P3P Preference Exchange
Lange (APPEL)

Cranor, L. L. (2002, April). A P3P
Preference Exchange Language 1.0
(APPEL1.0). Retrieved April 2013, from
World Wild Web Consortium:
http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P-preferences/

Rei: A Policy Specification
Language

Kagal, L. F. (2003). A policy Language
for a Pervasive Computing Environment.
IEEE 4th International Workshop on
Policies for Distributed Systems and
Networks (pp. 6374). Lake Como,
Italy:IEEE

extensible Access Control
Markup Language (XAMCL)

Mosses, T. (2005, February). OASIS
extensible Access Control Markup
Language (XAMCL) Version 2.0 Retrieved
April 2013 from OASIS Open:
http://docs.oasis
open, org/xacml/2 .o/access_controllxacml-2.0-core-spec-os.pdf

Platform for Privacy
Preferences Project (P3P)

Cranor, L. D. M. (2006, November). The
Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.1
(P3P1.1) Specification. Working Group
Note. Retrieved April 2013, from World
Wide Web Consortium:
http://www.w3.org/TR/P3Ppll/

Currently, out of all the known security policy

languages listed in table 2, XACML is the most widely
accepted, both in industry and academia,

as a de facto

standard. XAMCL is a declarative, XML based policy
language, mainly employed for access control management in

distributed systems. The framework proposed in this paper

is offered as a method of preparing policy implementation
for translation into formalized form through the use of

policy languages such as XACML. By creating this
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methodology,

the process of simplifying policy into

machine readable or formalized specifications becomes
standardized and lends itself towards the correct

implementation of security policy. While many of the

papers mentioned previously discuss the access control
mechanism or language model,

they do not offer a similar

framework for its application, nor a method of verifying

that the policies are being applied effectively.

As access control policies become more complex and
are implemented to manage large distributed networks with

many different organization units, policy makers and
auditors will find it difficult to assure that policy

specifications are correct, thereby allowing that these
policies are incorrectly enforced or implemented. Much
research has been developed to deal with the conformance

checking of access control policies for different security
levels

(Hu et al., 2007, 2011, Bryans, Fitzgerald, &

Periorellis, 2006, Bryans, 2005, Hughes & Bultan, 2008).
These approaches are based upon formal methods such as CSP

(Hinchey & Jarvis,

1995), Alloy model checker (Jackson,

2000), Vienna Development Method Specification Language

(Hansen & Bruun,

1996), among others. Besides being

focused on Role Based Access Control,

these models are

heavily math based in nature, making them problematic for
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use by people not well versed in this area. In addition,
these formal verification models do not easily map onto

implementation mechanisms

(e.g., organizational structure

and units), making it harder for auditors to test whether
a target network has implemented or enforced the access
control policy correctly.
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CHAPTER THREE

MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL POLICY

The main objective of this chapter is to demonstrate
a practical way to create an MLS access control policy

from an information flow policy diagram and an. MLS LDAP
model of an organization.

Information Flow
Policy

+

MLS Access
Control Policy

LDAP Directory
of the
Organization
Figure 8. Multi-Level Security Access Control Policy

Diagram Creation

3.1 Multi-Level Security Access
Control within a Department

The MLS Information Flow Policy relates the security
policies

(clearances, classifications and categories) and

how they interact with the information flows between

entities. In the example shown above, we have created an
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information flow policy based on our fictitious example of

the Department of Energy. Within this information flow
policy there are four clearances/classifications and five
categories for the agency depicted.

Figure 9. Multi-Level Security Information Flow Policy
Diagram

The clearances/classifications range from

unclassified, classified, secret and top secret. The
categories or need to know can be tailored to any agency's
specific information security requirements and are

33

therefore not described within this thesis. However, when

combined,
clearance,

the access control mechanism is a combination of

classification, and categories.

Access Protocol Directory Information Tree for the
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Research Sub Department of the Research and Design

Department

Figure 10 outlines a simple example of an MLS

Directory Information Tree (DIT) and contains the

additional attributes for security sensitivity and
categories discussed in the previous chapters . The MLS DIT

shows many different attributes for the Research

Department. These attributes assist in the defining of
permissions by filtering location or IP address, role,

sub-department, and department information. The additional

attributes created in the custom schema demonstrate the
MLS attributes of sensitivity and categories.
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#base OID 1. 2. 3.4. 5.1021. x. y
#x - 4 for objectclass
#y = 3 for attributetype
objectidentifier MLSschema 1.2.3.4.5.1021

attributeType ( MLSschema: 3.1 NAME 'sensitivity'
DESC ‘MLS sensitivity level'
EQUALITY caselgnoreMatch
SUBSTR caselgnoreSubstringsMatch
SYNTAX 1. 3. 6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15(40}
)
attributeType (MLSschema: 3. 2 NAME 'categories’
DESC 'MLS categories’
EQUALITY caselgnoreMatch
SUBSTR caselgnoreSubstringsMatch
SYNTAX 1.3. 6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15(40}
)
Objectclass (MLSschema: 4.1 NAME 'misperson’
DESC 'MLS person type'
SUP inetOrgPerson STRUCTURAL
MUST (sensitivity $ categories )
MAY (userpassword)

J________________________________________________________
Figure 11. Customized Schema for Multi-Level Security

Access Control

Demonstrating the application of these new

attributes, the two subjects, John Smith,

Scientist and

Betty Brown, staff also illustrates the flexibility of the
LDAP model. John Smith has a clearance of top secret, with

a category of (Cl, C2, C3}. This clearance and category

give John Smith access to information at top secret or
lower with the necessary categories,

or need-to-know,

to

access workgroup, sub Department, and Department

information. As the objects listed in the DIT apply the
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MLS information flow policy showing classification level,

as well as category restrictions,

the subject wishing to

commit an action on a particular object must hold a

clearance equal to or greater than the classification of
the object, as well as a superset of the object's
categories,

to commit any action on any particular object.

According to the MLS information flow policy, John
Smith can access certain resources,

assets, or devices on

the network, such as a printer or server. However,

there

are also objects that he cannot access because he does not
hold the correct category superset to do so. To
demonstrate the filtering that takes place when the
sensitivity and category attributes are implemented in the

LDAP, please refer to Figure 12 showing the MLS Access

Control Diagram for John Smith (scientist) and Betty Brown

(staff)

in which the relationship between the two subjects

and the available objects within the research
sub-department interact under the influence of the
information flow policy. The MLS access control policy

diagram illustrates the filtering process between objects

and the permission restrictions of John Smith and the
permissions restrictions of Betty Brown.

It is through combining the attributes of

sensitivity, category,

location, and object that the
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focused auditing tool can determine the potential
vulnerabilities and allows the auditor to focus their

penetration tests to verifying that the policies
protecting the security of these assets have been

implemented correctly. In comparison, black box testing
blindly looks for a single hole throughout the entire

system rather than focusing on where the holes are most
likely to be. By employing both methods of penetration
testing,

completing a thorough and productive audit of the

system's security is much more likely.
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MLS Access Control Diagram
Research Department

(jj
<£>

Figure 12. Multi-Level Security Access Control Diagram

The MLS access control policy diagram applies the MLS
information flow policy to the DIT and demonstrates how

the subject may access, or is prevented from accessing,

resources and devices on the research network, and this
depends on the sensitivity and category restrictions. The
subject John Smith holds a top secret clearance and

categories of {Cl, C2, C3} and has access to

classification levels of top secret or lower as long as he

holds a superset of the objects' categories. For
classification levels lower than top secret, it is
no-read-up and no-write-down. This indicates that John

Smith can access or read objects at a lower level, but he

cannot change or alter these objects in any way. This also

assumes that he holds a superset of the objects'

categories as well. The same holds true for Betty Brown,
who can access or read objects at a classified or lower
level but cannot change or alter those objects in any way;

This maintains the objects' information integrity at all
times.

3.2 Information Flow between Sub Departments
The below DIT includes added people, resources, and

devices and shows the sensitivity restrictions that
filters and controls the subject's access of objects and
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the corresponding object classifications and protections.

As the complexity of the DIT increases the object classes
and attributes built in the schemas of the LDAP,
particularly those built into the custom schema, acts as
the filters for the access control mechanism defined by
the MLS Information Flow Policy. By building these
additional security "filters" in the LDAP, access control

become significantly more transparent, effectively
applying the permissions/restrictions of the MLS
environment. Within the LDAP model directory, it is

possible to see the organization as a whole, defined by

the access control attributes which give the DIT its

filtering power.

41

Categories
ci
C2

Clearance/Classification
Public Access — No Category
Classified

C3
C4
CS

Secret

MLS Directory
Information Tree

Top Secret

O

OU = Servers

DNS 1

u

nll = printl

Printer 1

u

o

ou = Files
; Research 435

ou = Directory

ou = Files

Research

Payroll 122013

192,168.15.2

192.168.15.12

RD/Research

RD

RD/Pubiicity

Network

Network

John Smith

Scientists

Payroll

Research Dept

Research Dept

System

Scientists

ou = Directory

Payroll

John Smith

Top Secret

Top Secret

Top Sercret

Top Sercret

C5

CS

C4

C3,C5

jsmith @ energy.org

212-345-9987
Research Dept

192.163.15.4

HR Dept

HR Dept

Network
Staff

Research Dept

HR Project 1

RD/Research

James Ash

Staff______

Research

AshleyJ@energy.org

Network

Research Dept

R & D Dept

Staff

Classified

Classified

Cl

Top Sercret

Top Sercret

Classified

Cl, C2.C3, CS

C1.C2

Cl, C2

Cl

ou = Publicists

212-345-9997

PR Planning

Archive

RD/Pubiicity

RD/Publicity

Publicists

Staff

Publicity Dept

Network

f------------------System

Publicists

' Publicity Dept

Publicity Dept

i
I Public Access

Secret

| No Category

Classified

| HR Server
1192.168.10.6

Publicity Dept

(Network

Classified

[ Payrol

I-------------| HR Dept

Publicity Dept

Cl

C3
; Secret
I News Feature

iTop Secret

News

Cl, C3

I RD/Publicity
|------------------I Publicists

i RD/Pubiicity
Publicists

Publicity Dept

Publicity Dept

Classified

Classified
f

Cl

' Cl

Figure 13. Multi-Level Security Directory Information Tree For the Research and

Design Department
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Figure 14 details the effect of sub-department flows
on the MLS Access Control Diagram between Sub-Department
Research and Sub-Department Publicity. Here the

relationship between the Research personnel and objects

from both the Research and Publicity Sub-Departments are
illustrated. By creating this MLS Access Control Diagram

trust boundaries can be identified and potential threats
and vulnerabilities can be identified for the auditor to
investigate.
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between Sub-Departments Research and Publicity

The relationship between subjects of differing

sub-departments demonstrates the filtering and

compartmentalization process of applying the MLS
Information Flow Policy of the organization. Enforcing the

"no-read-up, no-write-down" can be clearly seen in the
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"flows" between sub departments and the subject John
Smith. Using the LDAP to create additional filtering, or
application of the MLS policies, can create synergies in

controlling the flow of information from one subject to
another. This assists auditors and security professionals

in creating new methodologies and tools for verifying that
these MLS policies are being enforced properly. By
standardizing this process of building semi-formal
specifications,

it allows security professionals and

auditors to become familiar with their policies and
systems in such a way that the potential vulnerabilities

become very apparent to them. In addition to applying
black box testing to find the "unknown" vulnerability in

the system using this auditing tool allows the IT staff to

continually look for holes in the implementation of their
security policies. Without the white box testing suggested

earlier in this paper, organizations are only as secure as

the skill level of the ad hoc talent of their testing

personnel.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DEVELOPING AUDITING TOOLS

4.1 Verifying Multi-Level Security Policies
Auditing and the process of verifying security

policies can overwhelm the best security professionals.
Depending on .the security requirements that an
organization adopts,

security audits can require hundreds

of man-hours and often interrupt business processes if not
managed correctly. Auditing often becomes a messy business

and can impose high costs on both agencies and private
organizations if not properly prepared. It is imperative
that through the process of the security assessment
auditors are able to clearly define the security goals of

the organization. A security audit may be different for
every organization, but they typically they include the

following.

Auditors must first determine the scope of their
security audit. By doing so,

they can limit the depth and

focus of the audit, controlling the size and organization
of the audit process. The Management Planning Guide for

Information Systems Security Auditing (December 2001)

outlines the auditing planning process written as a joint

initiative by the National State Association (NSAA) and
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the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). In this

document, the GAO describes the security auditing planning
process and creates a guide for organizations looking to
set up auditing within their agency. However,

the

remaining problem still exists in what is the most

effective way to verify that security policies are being
implemented and enforced correctly, and that the risk of

lost, stolen or destroyed information is minimized.
Typically the following steps are included in the audit

process.
1.

Define the physical scope of the audit. This

usually involves determining the area of the
organization being audited and tabulating the

physical assets that have been determined to be

critical to the organization.

2.

Define the process scope of the audit. This
means determining the critical processes to the
organization and their security.

3.

Develop a historical reconstruction of any known
security breaches, known vulnerabilities, and

issues that relate to the defined scope of the

audi t.
4.

Create the actual plan for conducting the audit

itself. Where will you start and how will you
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assess the system? This usually involves
creating a description of the audit, any

significant dates, participants to the
organization and dependencies.

5.

Complete a thorough security assessment of the

assets and processes within the organization.

This includes:
a.

Identify the exact location of assets

within the organization.
b.

Identify the potential threats to these

assets.
c.

Document the perceived vulnerabilities to
these assets and processes.

d.

Outline the current security controls in

place protecting these assets and
processes.
e.

Determine the quantitative likelihood of

threats being realized and the monetary

impact of these threats would have if
successfully exploited.

6.

Document the results of the audit.

7.

Specify and update assets with regards to any
new mitigation scenarios and newly established
controls.
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8.

Usually accompanying a thorough audit is the use
of black box penetration testing to verify that

there are no unknown vulnerabilities and that
the policies are being effectively enforced.
While this might sound clear in its direction,

the

problem remains of how black box testing will verify that

all of the policies are being effectively enforced. This
is particularly troubling when it becomes clear that it is
the usual practice to have penetration testers blindly

look for only one way into the system. How does "blind"

black box testing verify the complete and correct
implementation and enforcement of policy? How can

organizations be sure that the testing is thorough given
that the skill levels between penetration testers may vary
greatly?

By its nature, black box testing does not and cannot
accomplish this. This lack of effectiveness forms one of

the main problems in conducting a thorough audit of any
security system. Without focused penetration testing,
there cannot be a thorough audit of an information

system's security.
By adding this practical framework to the audit

planning, security auditors are now able to standardize
the process in which policies are specified more formally
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within their system. This gives them the design tools for
creating a database for focused penetration testing and

the ability verify security policies within their

organization.

4.2 Designing a Tool for Focused Auditing
The following Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD)

outlines the design of the penetration-testing database

that supports this framework. Based on the MLS directory

scheme of the LDAP model, the database matches
vulnerabilities to the permissions of object
classification,

categories, and users. By imputing the

information flow policy and detailing all of the subjects'

permission sets, auditors can query the relationship
between subject and objects allowing them to see where the
information flow policies should be enforced. The database

can correlates the vulnerabilities associated with these
relationships and directs the auditor to the appropriate
penetration test to verify the policy's enforcement.

Organizations would need to input their own users,

objects, and permission sets. After populating these
entries,

the organization would input all known potential

vulnerabilities associated with the trust boundaries

outlined within their system. These vulnerabilities could
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be matched with the appropriate penetration testing method
to ascertain whether, or not,

the organization's security 

policies are being enforced. After building this database,

auditors would then develop queries to look at subjects
and their permissions related to the objects within the

system.
Given the information provided in the query, auditors
would have a list of testing to be done based on each user

or groups of users that they examine. Figure 16 examines
the Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD)

for a penetration

testing database modeled after the example used in the
previous chapters. This model could be applied to suit any
organization using this framework.
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4.3 Database Entity Relationship Diagram
While the idea behind a penetration-testing database

and its implementation can be complex,

the design itself

is simple. Figure 15 illustrates that table People
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connects to table Object when selecting an object,

the

query is sent to the bridge table Access in order to
create a primary key using the Person_ID, Object_ID, and

Policy_ID and then table Policy then pulls the sensitivity
and categories of both the Person_ID and Object_ID,
matching the sensitivity and category set of the Object_ID

to the superset of the Person_ID. Once this is achieved,
and confirmed,

the Potential Vulnerability table creates a

vulnerability ID from the Access_ID in the Access Table,

listing the vulnerability type and description, showing
the vulnerabilities associated with the subject,

object,

and permission sets allowed/not allowed. The Potential

Vulnerability table then matches the penetration test
types and lists the penetration tests for the potential
vulnerabilities in the Pen Testing table. By using this

tool, the auditor can query each user and their
permissions on each object within the system to test for

potential holes in the system. Organizations, if they
prefer,

can also apply role based permission sets instead

of each individual persons in order to simplify the
testing process.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FUTURE WORK

5.1 Direction for Future Research
While this paper has helped to answer questions held

by the author, it has also created additional ones, in
particular,

the application and proper use of categories.

While a small question,

it affects the use and control of

attributes when designed into the information flow policy.

This has become an important issue in access control and

one that needs to be explored more fully.

The next step is to build a penetration testing
Database based on something real. This is necessary to

test the aptitude of the ERD design and application, of the

database in verifying security policies in a real world

setting. In addition, automating the actual testing by
creating scripts to run the tests, allowing the system to

monitor itself constantly would be ideal. This would allow
security policy people and system administrators to
automate the policy configuration. In addition they would

be able to standardize the security policy implementation

process for devices on the network and also automate the
process by which these policies are verified.
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APPENDIX

INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CUSTOMIZED
SCHEMA IN LIGHTWEIGHT DIRECTORY
ACCESS PROTOCOL
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Instructions For Implementing The Customized Schema
In Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

In this appendix, the following procedure is demonstrated for implementing custom
shemas in the LDAP model(for complete LDAP installation and configuration

instructions, please visit www.openlap.org):

1.

Create a new custom schema called MLS.schema.

2.

Based upon the MLS.schema, create a LDIF file (MLSl.lidf) and construct a
new directory structure.

First, in order to create a MLS schema as shown in the following diagram, the
MLS.schema contains two attribute defintions for sensitivity and categories and three
objectClass definitions for MLSpersonl, MLSperson2, and MLSperson3. Note that

MLSpersonl, MLSperson2 and MLSperson3 are sub-classes of Person,

organizationalPerson, and inetOrgPerson object class, respectively.
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File

[R

Edit View

Search Tools

Open v

save

©slapdxonf X 10 MLSl.ldlf

Documents Help
j,

k Undo

[fj MLS. sell ema K

i & % a [ m is
j
■ ■

.

phase OID: 1.2.3.4.5.1021.x.y
#x » 4 for Object classes
#x = 3 for Attribute types
objectidentifier MLSschema 1.2.3.4.5.1921

attributetype ( MLSschema:3.1 NAME 'sensitivity'
DESC 'MLS sensitivity level’
EQUALITY caselgnoreMatch
SUBSTR caselgnoreSubstringsMatch
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15(40}
)
attributetype ( MLSschema:3.2 NAME 'categories'
DESC 'MLS categories'
EQUALITY caselgnoreMatch
SUBSTR caselgnoreSubstringsMatch
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15(40}
)

i
i

objectclass ( MLSschema:4.1 NAME 'MLSperson*
DESC 'MLS person type 1 basic'
SUP
Person STRUCTURAL
MUST { sensitivity )
MAY ( userPassword $ telephoneNumber $ seeAlso $ description ) )
objectclass ( MLSschema:4.2 NAME 'MLSperson2‘
DESC 'MLS person type 2’
SUP
organizationalPerson STRUCTURAL
MUST ( sensitivity $ categories )
MAY ( userPassword $ telephoneNumber $ seeAlso $ description ) )
objectclass ( MLSschema:4.3 NAME 'MLSperson3'
DESC 'MLS person type 3* '
SUP
inetOrgPerson STRUCTURAL
MUST ( sensitivity $ categories )
MAY ( userPassword $ telephoneNumber $ seeAlso $ description ) )
V

Plain Text x

Figure 16: MLS schema.
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Three objects (John, Betty and Jennica) of class MLSperson, MLSperson2, and
MLSperson3 are created in the MLSl.ldif file.
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cn: John
sn: Smith
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cn: Betty
sn: Brown
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dn: cn=jennica,|au=research,ou=r&d/dc=energy,dc=gov
sensitivity: High
cn: Jennica
sn: Son
categories: C2
objectclass: Person
objectclass: organizationalPersan
objectclass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: MLSperson3
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Figure 17: MLS LDIF.
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'

The below diagram shows that three objects (John, Betty, and Jennica) are added to
create a LDAP tree, using the ldapadd command with MLSl.ldif as an input.
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System
______

!___ *__ J.______________________ :_____________

. fa

root@localhost:/etc/openldap

_

□

X

File Edit view Search Terminal Help
[root@localhost openldapj# ldapadd -x -D ncn=Manager,dc=energy,dc=gov“ -W -f MLSl.ldif
Enter LDAP Password:
adding new entry “cn=john,ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=govH
adding new entry "cn=betty,ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energyfdc=govB
adding new entry “cn=jennica,ou=research tou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov“
[root@localhost openldap]# |
1

E

o direct input to this VM, click inside or press Ctrl+G.

Figure 18: Adding new entries to the customized MLS LDAP.

The LDAP directory displays all the entries in the LDAP tree using the ldapsearch
command as seen in Figure 20.
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root@local host:/etc/o p e n I d a p
®______________________

„ □ x
4

I

[rootglocalhost openldap]# Idapsearch -x -D "cn^anager.dc-energy.dc^gov" -b "dc=energy,dc=gov
'(objectClass=*)1 -W
Enter LDAP Password:
# extended LDIF
#
#. LDAPV3
# base <dc=energy,dc=gov> with scope subtree
# filter; (objectClass=*)
# requesting; ALL

1

r

V

I

i

# energy.gov
dn: dc=energy,dc=gov
objectclass: top
objectclass: domain
de: energy
# r&d, energy.gov
dn: ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
objectclass: organizationalUnit
ou: r&d

# research, r&d, energy.gov
dn: ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
objectclass: organizationalUnit
ou: research

t
<

# john, research, r&d, energy.gov
dn; cn=john,ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
sensitivity: High
cn: John
sn: Smith
□bjectClass: person
objectclass: MLSperson

f

L,

# betty, research, r&d, energy.gov
dn; cn=betty,ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
sensitivity: High
cn: Betty
sn: Brown
categories: Cl
objectclass: person
objectclass: organizationalPerson
objectclass: MLSperson2
•rraiincAt—■—"lau vviuui. u *----- urn

§ ei

To direct input to this VMt dick inside or press Ctrl+G,

Figure 19: LDAP Tree in the OpenLDAP file.
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The complete ldapsearch result is shown below in Figure 21.
Enter LDAP Password:
# extended LDIF
#
#LDAPv3
# base <dc=energy,dc=gov> with scope subtree
# filter: (objectCIass^*)
# requesting: ALL
#
# energy.gov
dn: dc=energy,dc=gov
objectCIass: top
objectCIass: domain
de: energy
# r&d, energy.gov
dn: ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
objectCIass: organizationalUnit
ou: r&d
# research, r&d, energy.gov
dn; ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
objectCIass: organizationalUnit
ou:research

# john, research, r&d, energy.gov
dn: cn=john,ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
sensitivity: High
cn: John
sn: Smith
objectCIass: person
objectCIass: MLSperson
# betty, research, r&d, energy.gov
dn: cn=betty,ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
sensitivity: High
cn: Betty
sn: Brown
categories: Cl
objectCIass: person
objectCIass: organizationalPerson
objectCIass: MLSperson2
# jennica, research, r&d, energy.gov
dn: cn=jennica,ou=research,ou=r&d,dc=energy,dc=gov
sensitivity: High
cn: Jennica
sn:Son
categories: C2
objectCIass; person
objectCIass: organizationalPerson
objectCIass: inetOrgPerson
objectCIass: MLSperson3
# search result
search: 2
result: 0 Success
# numResponses: 7
# numEntries: 6

Figure 20: LDAP search results.
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NOTES

1 National Institute of Standards and Technology is the
federal technology agency that works with industry to
develop and apply technology, measurements, and
standards. For more information see
http://www.nist.gov and
http://csrc.nist.gov/\publications/PubsSPs.html
2 Federal Information Security Management Act is a federal
law enacted as title III of the E-Government Act of
2002. For additional information see
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/overview.html
for additional information.
3 Federal Information Processing Standard issued under the
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
began to issue standards and guidelines developed by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) for Federal computer systems. For additional
information see
http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/geninfo,htm
4 Black Box Penetration Testing requires no knowledge of
the system being tested and simulates the approach of
an uninformed attacker, or hacker, attempting to
breach the system.
5 XACML stands for extensible Access Control Markup
Language and is used in programming access control
policies. The language is implemented in XML and used
a process model to evaluate access control queries
according to the information flow policy of an
organization.
6 The Ponder language provides a common means of
specifying security policies that map onto various
access control implementation mechanisms for
firewalls, operating systems, databases and Java
(Damianou, 2001).
7 A conceptual model used in project management through
which a new information system develops from the
initial feasibility study and Design stage of the new
system to maintenance of the completed system.
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8 Trust boundaries,
by identifying
flows, or user
method used to
flows, or user

according to Microsoft, are determined
whether an asset's upstream data
input, are trusted or not and the
authenticate, or authorize, these data
inputs, if they are not.

9 Multi-Level Security is the application of security
controls in a computer system to restrict the access
of information/resources/assets based on security
clearance/sensitivity (i.e. top secret, secret, etc...)
and the need to know level (categories) of people
using the system.
10 NISTIR 7316, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 September
2006. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/
7316/NISTIR-7316.pdf
11 Bell-LaPadula Model is used to define access control in
government and military organizations and was
developed by David Elliott Bell and Leonard J.
LaPadula, to establish U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) Multi-Level Security (MLS) policy.
.1

12 An information, flow policy defines the different
classes of information in an agency that can exist in
a system and how information flows between them.
13 The lattice based security model (access control
model)is based on a complex interactions between any
combination of objects (assets or resources) and
subjects (people or groups of people).

14 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is a security mechanism
that restricts the level of control that users
(subjects) have over the objects that they create.
Unlike in a Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
implementation, where users have full control over
their own files, directories, etc., MAC adds
additional labels, or categories, to all file system
objects. Users and processes must have the
appropriate access to these categories before they
can interact with these objects. Source:
http://www.centos .org/docs/5/html/5.l/Deployment_Guid
e/sec-mac-introl. html
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15

X.500 data model has been adopted by the LDAP protocol.
For additional information please refer to RFC 2251.

16

For more detailed information regarding attributes,
please refer to RFC 2251.

17

Newer versions of CentOS have changed the method of
implementing OpenLDAP; please refer to the website
www.openldap.com for updated instructions.
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